Articles and Book Chapters
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Abstract. Homeschooling is on the rise. It appeals to very different perspectives and ideologies that tend not to have common ground, from classical conservative to radical progressive. But the justifications for the practice are weak. In this paper, we build a case against the “home school” as a political practice using the existing commitments of liberal, conservative, and democratic theories of education. Whether education should aim at the cultivation of children's autonomy, their formation as members of cultural communities, or their training as democratic citizens, there are reasons to doubt that the practice of homeschooling can fulfill our educational goals. As such, we argue that liberals, conservatives, and democrats each have their own motivations to oppose homeschooling as an institutional alternative to traditional schools. Through our critiques, we also advance a metatheoretical argument in favor of centering the aims of education in our philosophical and political debates.
You can listen to me talk about homeschooling and educational fragmentation on The Economist’s Weekend Intelligence podcast.
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with Sally Haslanger, Zeitschrift für die Didaktik der Philosophie und Ethik (ZDPE), Issue 3, August 2025.
Abstract. Metaphysics is an integral part of feminist philosophy. The history of feminist thought in large part consists in attempts to illuminate the nature of gender and gendered social arrangements. This article argues in favor of the philosophical and pedagogical importance of feminist metaphysics by articulating three central areas of contemporary concern: i) how to conceptualize sex and gender; ii) the formation of social subjects; and iii) social ontology, especially social practices, structures, and systems. In addition to its relevance to central metaphysical questions, feminist work in these areas yields a number of valuable methodological and epistemological insights.
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Chapter in Handbook of Equality of Opportunity, Sardoč, Mitja (eds), Springer, 2024.
Abstract.Merit and meritocracy are the targets of a wide range of critiques from across the ideological spectrum. This chapter proposes a reconceptualization of the two notions. Merit is defined as an open-ended, functional principle of distributive justice that necessarily attaches to the values and conceptions of the good operative in a given social practice or institution. The idea of meritocracy refers to social arrangements in which valued goods are distributed primarily or even exclusively in accordance with judgments of merit. Given the open-endedness of merit and its attachment to other norms and goals, meritocracies themselves come in a variety of forms. Meritocracy is a spectrum, not a monolith. The chapter introduces the distinction between two polar opposite models of meritocracy: telic and procedural. After offering a brief critique of the familiar procedural ideal of a free market of careers open to talents, the chapter develops a third conception of substantive meritocracy that lies between the procedural and telic extremes. A model of substantive meritocracy is illustrated in the context of college and university admissions.
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Abstract. Most critics of our contemporary meritocratic practices and institutions believe their arguments speak to the defects of the ideal of meritocracy itself. I argue that this is a misguided generalization because meritocracy can take many forms depending on the conception of the good and broader theory of justice to which the distributive principle of merit it is attached. To illustrate, I contrast two radically different forms of meritocracy – a telic or end-oriented model based on Plato’s Kallipolis and a procedural model inherent in our free market of careers open to talents. Far from being a unified ideal, meritocracy is a spectrum of social and political arrangements, ranging between the telic and the procedural poles. Thus, identifying ‘merit’ and ‘meritocracy’ as the main sources of injustice in our contemporary societies further conceals the background conditions and underlying commitments that should be subject to our critical scrutiny.
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with Jeremy Kingston Cynamon, Polity, Volume 56, Number 1, 163-18, 2023.
Abstract. This paper develops a critical normative analysis of charter schools. It categorizes and evaluates the main arguments in defense of charters: market competition, improved learning outcomes, autonomy and innovation, and their potential to function as “counterpublics.” After finding each argument wanting, the paper proposes a tripartite critique of charters based on (i) their deleterious effects on social solidarity, (ii) the procedural injustice involved in access, and (iii) their substantively unjust outcomes. We show how charter schools undermine social and political solidarity by fragmenting communities into more homogenous subsets. Although they purport to be equally open to all, charters covertly rely on morally arbitrary characteristics such as class, race, and disability in admissions. Finally, we argue that they unfairly reduce the quality of education for some students, thus resulting in substantively unjust outcomes.
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with Jeremy Kingston Cynamon, Power and Education, Volume 14, Issue 3, 247-261, 2022.
Abstract. The authors argue that from the perspective of distributive justice, school district fragmentation—meaning both the existing reality of hyper-proliferated school districts and the practice of further breaking larger districts into smaller ones—produces three distinct injustices. First, it undermines racial solidarity and the bonds of community. Second, it violates the demands of procedural justice. And third, it leads to substantively unfair outcomes. Taken together, these concerns suggest that to create a more just educational system we ought to resist further fragmentation and push for larger, more consolidated school districts coupled with progressive redistributive funding. To support this central normative argument, the article provides two justifications for conceptualizing education as a fundamental entitlement and its provision as a form of mutual aid.
Other Publications
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Blog of the APA (American Philosophical Association), January 7, 2026
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Chapter in Opportunity after Neoliberalism, Brookings Institution, forthcoming.
Abstract. Merit and meritocracy have become usual suspects in critiques of neoliberalism. Some critics accuse our societies of being too meritocratic, relying excessively on individual choices and capacities, as opposed to social solidarity or reciprocity, in the allocation of goods and positions. Merit, they insist, is part and parcel of a neoliberal order that we should oppose altogether. Others complain that our societies are not meritocratic enough – that they do not live up to our ideal of meritocracy because of the inequalities that skew competition among individuals. Unfortunately, these debates are not particularly productive because we lack a shared understanding of what we mean by ‘merit’ and ‘meritocracy’. In this essay I argue that our confusion is owed in part to the fact that merit and meritocracy are not standalone principles; they necessarily attach to a broader social and political theory. Consequently, in order to even ask what merit might look like after neoliberalism, we must first distinguish neoliberal meritocracy from other possible meritocratic arrangements. Neoliberal meritocracy, I argue, is a flawed ideal insofar it attaches to certain defining features of neoliberalism as an economic and political regime, including a series of individualist assumptions, an understanding of individual freedom as the highest good, and a commitment to a particular free markets regime as the only means to securing individual freedom. In the last section of the essay I suggest that the problems with neoliberal meritocracy are not problems with merit and meritocracy in themselves. Both ideals can be detached from neoliberal commitments and drafted into a more democratic vision of society committed to the development of everyone’s capacities.
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Brandeis Journal of Politics, 2021, pp. 8-13.